The observation that two theories share the same formal structure, that is, differ only in the interpretation placed on symbols, can almost always be used to simplify a body of knowledge. The purpose of this communication is to demonstrate that Cournot's theories of duopoly and complementary monopoly are formally identical; furthermore, a precise statement of the correspondence which identifies them serves to extend a famous criticism of the duopoly theory.
Cournot's duopoly theory (Cournot, 1963 , chap. vii) applies to a market situation in which two producers sell identical products, and his complementary monopoly theory (Cournot, 1963 , chap. ix) to a market situation in which two producers sell products which are of no use unless combined in a fixed ratio (say 1:1) to form a composite commodity. Edgeworth observed that, in the former case, "there cannot well be supposed two prices; and [in the latter case] . .. there cannot be supposed two (independent variations of the) quantities" (Edgeworth, 1925 Prices and quantities are determined in the Cournot solutions to the duopoly and complementary monopoly problems according to the analysis shown on the following page. This presentation establishes the formal equivalence of the two theories; it is immediately clear how one can be obtained from the other by a simple reinterpretation of symbols. A consequence of the equivalence is that a theorem for one theory is a theorem for the other; for example, the well-known result that the quantity supplied under duopoly is greater than the quantity supplied under pure monopoly may be translated into the proposition that the price charged under complementary monopoly is higher than the price charged under pure monopoly.
The focus of Edgeworth's criticism of the Cournot duopoly solution is the observation:
(1) At a positive profit equilibrium, each duopolist can obtain a greater revenue by reducing his price a little and selling the quantity that clears the market (provided, of course, the other duopolist does not change his price).' Edgeworth was apparently unaware of the possibility that this criticism could be reinterpreted so as to be applicable to the case of complementary monopoly. He believed that the Cournot solution was more plausible for complementary monopoly (Edgeworth, 1925, pp. 136-37) and observed, as his only objection to the Cournot solution, that it requires each monopolist to act as if the other monopolist will not change his price. This is of course a very important criticism, which in fact applies equally well to Cournot's duopoly solution; however, it is not the counterpart of (1).
(1') is (1) reinterpreted for the case of complementary monopoly; it appears never to have been used to criticize Cournot's solution to the complementary monopoly problem.
(1') At a positive profit equilibrium, each monopolist can obtain a greater revenue by reducing his quantity a little and selling at the price that clears the market (provided, of course, the other monopolist does not change his quantity).2 I A quantity q clears the market if either (a) demand price at q = the price at which q is supplied (called the supply price at q), or (b) demand price at q < supply price at q, and q = 0.
2 A price p clears the market if either (a) quantity demanded at p = quantity supplied at p, or (b) quantity demanded at p < quantity supplied at p, and p = 0.
